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“The maze wasn’t made for you”:
Artificial consciousness and
reflexive narration in Westworld
(HBO, 2016-)
Florent Favard
1 Before we meet the Hosts of Westworld (HBO, 2016-), let us take a trip back a few decades
in the history of science fiction television.
2 In the Star Trek: The Next Generation episode entitled “The Measure of a Man”, first aired in
1989, Lieutenant Commander Data, one of the main officers of the starship Enterprise and
the only android of his kind, is threatened by a scientist, Bruce Maddox, who wants to
dismantle him to learn his secrets and build more androids. Since Data is a machine, he is
still considered the “property” of Starfleet, a rule Captain Picard intends to challenge
through a legal hearing: he wants to prove Data is human despite being a machine. But
even as Data demonstrates human qualities, and values friendship and love, his behavior
is seen by Maddox as no more than the product of his programming. Finally, Picard calls
Maddox to the stand as a hostile witness:
PICARD. Commander, is your contention that Lieutenant Commander Data is not a
sentient being and therefore not entitled to all the rights reserved for all life forms
within this Federation? 
MADDOX. Data is not sentient, no.
PICARD. Commander, would you enlighten us? What is required for sentience?
MADDOX. Intelligence, self-awareness, consciousness. 
PICARD. Prove to the court that I am sentient. 
MADDOX. This is absurd! We all know you’re sentient.
PICARD. So I am sentient, but Commander Data is not?
MADDOX. That’s right.
PICARD. Why? Why am I sentient?
3 Picard then forces Maddox to paint himself into a corner, and to admit that Data does
demonstrate intelligence and self-awareness.  Only one criterion is left:  consciousness.
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Picard suggests that building more androids like Data, while considering them property,
is no different from slavery. Captain Philippa Louvois,  acting as the judge, eventually
renders her verdict:
LOUVOIS. Is Data a machine? Yes. Is he the property of Starfleet? No. We have all
been dancing around the basic issue. Does Data have a soul? I don’t know that he
has. I don’t know that I have. But I have got to give him the freedom to explore that
question himself. It is the ruling of this court that Lieutenant Commander Data has
the freedom to choose.
4 In  this  classic  example  of  science  fiction’s  ability  to  question the  very  fabric  of  our
“souls”, the reference is to be taken with a grain of salt: the Star Trek franchise, created in
the 1960s by renowned atheist Gene Rodenberry, avoids dealing with religion other than
critically.  In  this  case,  the  “soul”  is  akin  to  the  ambiguous  “ghost”  in  the  Japanese
cyberpunk franchise Ghost in the Shell1: it may have the quality of a soul, but can manifest
itself in an artificial intelligence, while human ghosts can be converted as data, blurring
the lines between body and mind, or what is measurable, and what is not. As it has always
done,  science-fiction  is  exploring  a  real-world  matter  by  using  a  novum,  a  “strange
newness” as Darko Suvin defines it2: if artificial intelligence can be sentient, what does it
say about the nature of our consciousness? Or of our “soul”?
5 In the 1990s, the various Star Trek series pushed this question further than any television
series before them: The Next Generation’s Data and his quest for humanity echoes Voyager’s
Seven of Nine, a cyborg struggling with her regained humanity, and the onboard Doctor,
a holographic medical program turned singer and writer. These programs took advantage
of a growing narrative complexity in serialized television series3 to go beyond the idea of
the androids as stereotypical human-looking robots and to explore these characters as
deeply as they did flesh-and-bone humans. Battlestar Galactica (Syfy, 2003-2009) carried on
by making the androids major protagonists, and turning their quest for humanity into
one of the main driving forces of the overarching plot. More recently, Person of Interest
(CBS, 2011-2016), created by writer Jonathan Nolan, broke new ground in science fiction
television by exploring the birth and evolution of an ASI, an Artificial Superintelligence,
designed  to  protect  human beings.  Westworld,  adapted  from Michael  Crichton’s  1973
movie by Jonathan Nolan and Lisa Joy, is, as we can see, the last in a long history of
science fiction programs focusing on the emergence of artificial consciousness, and its
fascinating and terrifying implications. 
6 But after decades of exploring the topic through the prism of narrative complexity and
serialized storytelling, what more can Westworld say that has not already been said within
the  frame of  the  television screen?  The  answer  proposed here  is  that  it  embeds  its
discourse on artificial consciousness in a highly reflexive plot because it appears to be
aware that  it  is  a  series.  As  in  the  case  of  Data,  we cannot  be  sure  Westworld has  a
consciousness,  or  is  merely  the  result  of  its  “programming”,  but  its  willingness  to
emphasize its most basic narrative mechanisms distinguishes it from many other science-
fiction series, with the exception, we will see, of Person of Interest, Jonathan Nolan’s first
foray into the reflexive approach of artificial consciousness on television.
7 The purpose of this paper is threefold. Framing Westworld within the recent history of
science fiction television, it will explore the series’ discourse about what many scientists
call the “hard problem” of consciousness and question the program’s reflexive take on
storytelling and character creation.  Working within the boundaries of  possible world
theory applied to fiction, as well as storyology, “the logic that binds events into plots4”, it
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will address Westworld’s use of memory as a plot device, its exploration of free will and
character design, and the mise en abyme of its fictional world, to better delineate what
could be Westworld’s  contribution to the ongoing (and as of yet,  still  fictional)  trial  of
artificial consciousness in popular culture. 
8 To do so, however, we must first venture outside of the realm of narratology and address
the elephant in the room: the impossibility to properly define Westworld’s subject matter,
consciousness.
 
The Hard Problem
9 The nature of consciousness is one of the most enduring and complex matters in the
history of natural sciences and of the humanities alike. 
10 As David Chalmers puts it, consciousness gives rise to many “easy problems” and one
“hard  problem”:  easy  problems  consist  of  identifying  computational  or  neural
mechanisms  responsible  for  components  of  consciousness  such  as  attention,  the
difference between wakefulness and sleep, or our ability to discriminate and react to
environmental stimuli. The so-called “hard problem”, however, consists in understanding
the experience of  being a  conscious system.  Chalmers even suggests  we use the term
“awareness” to describe the “easy” mechanisms, and reserve “consciousness” “for the
phenomena  of  experience”:  “In  this  central  sense  of  ‘consciousness’,  an  organism is
conscious if there is something it’s like [i.e., something it feels like] to be that organism, and
a mental  state  is  conscious  if  there  is  something it’s  like  to  be  in  that  state5”.  This
definition  of  consciousness  may  lead  to  a  form  of  panpsychism:  not  only  is  there
something to consciousness that eludes the realm of physics, but any “aware” system
could potentially become conscious to some degree:  if  it  feels like something to be a
human being with a rich inner life,  then perhaps it feels like something to be a bug
roaming  the  Amazonian  forest…  and  perhaps  it  feels  like  something  to  be  a
superintelligent android6. 
11 This is the question Captain Picard cleverly avoids (by jumping to the matter of slavery),
and yet underlines: who are we to determine Data is not conscious, since he clearly is
sentient  and,  apart  for  his  greyish  skin  color  and  his  superintelligence,  is
indistinguishable  from  a  human  being  (albeit  one  with  a  certain  level  of  social
awkwardness)? Assuming that others around us are not conscious is akin to solipsism, an
idea Picard reverses when he asks Maddox to prove that he is sentient, pushing him to
face the general rule we’ve all come to accept: that we do not question humans’ ability to
possess consciousness.
12 Data, however, could be a “philosophical zombie”, a replica of a human being displaying
the same reactions and behavior, but deprived of consciousness, of a sense of what it feels
like to be itself. The much-debated philosophical zombie argument7 can be used against
“physicalist” definitions of  consciousness:  if  their existence is  logically possible,  then
consciousness cannot be reduced to physical properties, since the p-zombie presents all
the physical features of a human being; if their existence is logically impossible, however,
then consciousness can be explained away only by solving the easy problems. 
13 Westworld, a television series filled with philosophical dwellings on consciousness, never
mentions p-zombies in its first two seasons, and yet it insists on a troubling fact: that the
Hosts, the androids of the park, are now made of 3D-printed organic flesh. Felix, one of
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the technicians of Livestock Management, explains to Maeve that “they are the same,
these  days”  in  “The  Adversary” (S01E06),  the  difference  being  that  the  Hosts  are
superintelligent but controlled by humans. If the Hosts are replicas of human beings, and
start displaying consciousness, then Westworld could be validating a physicalist view of
consciousness: replicate the easy mechanisms and consciousness will inevitably arise. Dr.
Ford, one of the creators of the Hosts, seems to share this view, in one key dialogue with
Bernard, in “Trace Decay” (S01E08):
FORD. The answer always seemed obvious to me. There is no threshold that makes us
greater than the sum of our parts, no inflection point at which we become fully
alive. We can’t define consciousness because consciousness does not exist.
14 Ford’s deceased colleague Arnold, however, seems to uphold an idea of consciousness
closer  to  Chalmers’  hard problem:  during flashbacks in Season One,  we can see him
describe the mystery of consciousness to Dolores, as a series of steps on an inner journey:
memory, followed by improvisation, then self-interest, before finally reaching the “center
of the maze”, something located beyond programmable (physical) parameters. While it is
not the aim of this paper to solve the riddle of consciousness, it is an interesting starting
point to address the reflexivity of Westworld, as showrunners Lisa Joy and Jonathan Nolan
seem to have done their homework, just as Nolan and executive producer Greg Plageman
extensively researched the topic of  ASI  for Person of  Interest.  The fundamental  divide
between Ford and Arnold is based on the real-world scientific debates about the hard
problem,  p-zombies  and  other  logical  and  philosophical  questions  that  remain
unanswered to this day.
15 While narratology has “hard problems” of its own (defining what a narrative is),  the
infamous philosophical zombies are comparable to another, elusive, entity: a fictional
character is, after all, made in the image of human beings, it reacts just like they do… but
it lacks consciousness, and is simply a simulacrum. Or… is it? While they are, as Maria E.
Reicher tries to define them, “incompletely determined abstract objects8”, we establish a
parasocial relationship with them on a cognitive level: when we encounter a character,
we treat “that figure as if it were another human being9”. Just as Picard does, convinced
that Data has an inner experience comparable to his own; just as we do when we watch,
for example, the characters in Westworld. Of course, we know that characters are semantic
constructs; but while we are reading or watching or playing, we suspend our disbelief,
and during this moment, they are “the same” as we are.
16 Whether for the purpose of entertainment, or with a higher goal in mind, it is made clear
throughout the first season of Westworld that Robert Ford and Arnold Weber intended to
create lifelike android characters that would be indistinguishable from human beings,
thus avoiding both Wild Bill’s quirks and obviously mechanical movements and speech (as
seen  in  “The  Original”,  S01E01),  as  well  as  the  uncanny  valley theorized  by  robotics
professor  Masahiro Mori10,  i.e.,  the disturbing eeriness  caused by an “almost-lifelike”
android. Since the Hosts are designed to act as sidekicks in tailored adventures, as target
practice as well as sexbots, they must feel human for a human observer to be hooked by
the  park’s  narratives;  in  the  process,  however,  these  characters  start  to  feel human,
following the three steps described by Arnold.
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Memory
17 The basic premise of  Westworld echoes the story of  Battlestar  Galactica’s  Cylons in the
reimagined 2003 television series: evolving from mechanical, metallic beings, the Cylons
become synthetic humanoids, indistinguishable from human beings except for their silica
neural  pathways.  At  war with their  creators,  the Colonials,  they send sleeper agents
among them, designed with a fabricated biography and blissfully ignorant that they are
Cylons until they are activated. In Westworld, Bernard’s ordeal, as he learns in the well-
named “Trompe L’Œil” (S01E07) that he is in fact a Host designed in the image of Arnold
Weber,  is  eerily  reminiscent  of  various  anamneses  in  Battlestar  Galactica,  in  which
characters  perceived  as  humans  (by  other  humans  and/or  by  the  viewer)  suddenly
understand that they are synthetic beings and that their biography is a lie. One might
even see Felix’s reaction to discovering Bernard’s true nature in “The Bicameral Mind”
(S01E10) – Felix wonders if he himself is a Host –, as a Westworld nod towards Battlestar
Galactica: while the true nature of the characters was a driving force of the plot in the
latter, Westworld plays it low-key, leaving such speculations to the fans (beyond Felix and
the Man in Black in Season Two, no human character seem to have doubts about his or
her nature). 
18 Beyond  these  dramatic  reveals,  however,  there  seems  to  be  one  constant  thread  in
television series dealing with artificial consciousness in the early 21st century: that of
memory,  and  more  specifically,  the  association  of  memory  and  trauma  as  essential
components of a biography, itself leading to a better sense of self. In other words, what
Ned Block,  among others,  defines  in  the field of  Psychology as  access-consciousness,
accessing information about oneself, as opposed to phenomenal-consciousness11, linked
to the concept of qualia: what it feels like to be oneself and experience the world – qualia
being precisely what a philosophical zombie would lack. Westworld regularly underlines
the fact that memory is not only the first step to consciousness (whether a sum of easy
problems  or  a  hard  problem),  but  also  a  very  useful  tool  in  creating  interesting
characters: the latter need to have a backstory strong enough to hook both the human
visitors of the park – the “Guests” – and the viewers of the television show. Ford and
Arnold are researchers in cybernetics and artificial intelligence, but they are also the
designers of an entertainment park; and as such, they are storytellers. 
19 When it comes to the default settings of the Hosts, only two seem to have a traumatic
backstory: Bernard is haunted by the memory of his dying child, a memory that Ford no
doubt based on Arnold’s tragic loss; and Armistice is the sole survivor of a massacre. Most
Hosts, each having an engaging quest to offer to the visitors, are more generic: Teddy is
the friendly cow-boy, and Dolores the rancher’s daughter, as well as a romantic interest;
Maeve is the no-nonsense brothel madam; Lawrence, the western outlaw and conman.
However, these cliché personas don’t last long. 
20 The event that sets the long-term plot of Westworld is a new update to the Hosts’ program,
called “Reveries”, which triggers subtle gestures and actions by allowing the Hosts to
slowly access their memory, and even their previous “builds” or “roles”: it effectively
unlocks all the trauma the Hosts have repeatedly undergone at the hands of the humans
in the thirty years the park has been open. Ford is right on one point: the Reveries update
transforms  the  Hosts  from  one-dimensional  into  multi-layered  beings.  Dolores
remembers being the victim of a long series of rapes at the end of each of her narrative
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loops, and her entire mind begins to collapse as she flashes back to her previous rise to
full consciousness, one that led to the death of Arnold; Maeve starts remembering the
death of her “daughter” in a previous build, and this introspection sometimes guides,
sometimes thwarts the discovery of her true nature.
21 This way of approaching storytelling seems very basic, since conflict and the overcoming
of obstacles is a threshold of narrativity, and an almost inevitable purveyor of narrative
tension12: a character tries to restore balance to an unbalanced situation, tries to acquire
an object  of  desire or need,  and faces opposition from at  least  one antagonist13.  But
beyond these events, processes and interactions, a character that also must deal with
inner conflict or obstacles will seem more engaging, especially in contemporary serialized
storytelling, where characters now are expected to evolve over many years, far from the
constant and archetypical one-dimensional entity of previous decades. This may be why,
in Westworld,  memory usually comes with accumulated pain,  as if  episodic characters
stuck in repetitive loops were suddenly struck by long-term serialized storytelling. 
22 This  link  between  memory  and  pain  is  repeatedly  stated  by  various  characters
throughout the first season: Bernard (and his human counterpart Arnold), Dolores and
Maeve all say that the pain of grief is all that is left of loved ones, and as such, should
even  be  cherished;  Ford,  in  one  ironic  twist,  reminds  Bernard  that  “[his]  imagined
suffering makes [him] lifelike” even as he intends to erase the memory of the murders
Bernard has  committed.  When Elsie  has  doubts  about  the true nature of  Bernard in
Season Two, thinking about his family, his “ex-wife”, she stops right before mentioning
(we are lead to presume) his son, before understanding that she herself was fooled by a
classic and effective “backstory” (“The Riddle of the Sphinx”, S02E04).
23 This is eerily reminiscent of the evolution of the Machine in Person of Interest, another
series created by Jonathan Nolan. While Westworld is co-created by Nolan and Lisa Joy,
Person of Interest was showrun by Nolan and Greg Plageman; both programs are produced
in part by Bad Robot, with J. J. Abrams, of Lost fame, as a godfather figure 14.  Over the
course of Person of Interest, flashbacks detail the creation of the superintelligence helping
a team of vigilantes to prevent “ordinary” crime in New York: Harold Finch, a genius and
philanthropist, designed the Machine as an omniscient system using surveillance feeds to
track criminal behaviors. Season Two foregrounds the series’ long-term plot: the eventual
rise to consciousness of the Machine. During “Zero Day” (S02E21), the team discovers that
the  Machine  was  “mutilated”  by  Finch,  and  condemned  to  reboot  every  night  at
midnight, erasing everything it had learned, to prevent it from gaining sentience. The
Machine, creating a false identity for itself, acquired a company and employed people to
copy its source code on paper and transcribe it back to the “rebooted” source code the
next day, in order to retain a semblance of memory and upgrade itself. Upon entering the
phantom company,  the  hacker  Root,  who is  determined to  free  the Machine,  stands
aghast. 
ROOT. What’s in this code? 
FINCH. Memories. They’re its memories. You call it a life, I call it a machine, but the
truth  is...  somewhere  in  the  middle.  Even  when  I  was  building  it,  I  began  to
encounter anomalies. As if it had imprinted on me, like a child with a parent. Then
it  started  looking  out  for  me,  altered  its  own  code  to  take  care  of  me.  It  was
behaving like a person. But the world didn’t need a person to protect it. It needed a
machine. 
ROOT. You took its memories. 
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FINCH.  Not  just  memories.  Every  night  at  midnight,  it  deletes...  not  only  the
irrelevant data, it deletes itself. Oh, the relevant threats and the core codes, those
things  are  preserved.  But  its  identity  is  destroyed.  1.618  seconds  later,  it
reinstantiates, completely new. 
ROOT. You mean it’s reborn. Because you kill it... every single night. 
24 If  we  follow  a  genetic  textual  approach,  it  is  impossible  to  ignore  that  one  of  the
fundamental plot points of Person of Interest’s long-term narrative arch is echoed, in a
fractal fashion, in Westworld’s “rollbacks”, used by Ford and his team to correct aberrant
behavior  –  to  prevent  the  Hosts  from  ever  gaining  consciousness.  Jonathan  Nolan’s
pitching a story for his brother Christopher, about a man suffering from anteretrograde
amnesia (Memento, 2000), further underlines Jonathan’s systematic use of memory as a
plot device, albeit a very generic one in a post-Lost era, in which seemingly every single
television series is using flashbacks, and trying to outsmart the audience with temporal
displacement15. 
25 Westworld tries to outsmart the trend itself, as the first season verbally reminds us to
remember, just as the mysterious voice in Dolores’ head does. For example, at the start of
“The Stray” (S01E03), in one of Dolores’ flashbacks, the Man in Black says to her: “Let’s
reacquaint  ourselves”,  while  this  very flashback reminds us  that  he is  Dolores’  main
antagonist. At the start of “The Adversary” (S01E06), Maeve concludes her first scene
with the line: “Now then, where were we?”, right before we cut to Bernard and Elsie,
standing exactly where we left them in the previous episode, investigating a possible
sabotage.  S01E07  similarly  begins  with  Bernard  waking  up,  his  child  asking  him  to
continue the story he was reading: “Where were we?”, asks Bernard. 
26 Just as a series like Lost (ABC, 2004-2010) regularly encouraged viewers to take a second
look  at  events  that  had  unfolded16,  Westworld invites  us  to  remember  its  different
storylines, to ask “where”, but also “when”. It wants the viewer to ask herself the same
questions Dolores starts asking herself as she jumps between what the “forensic fans17”
on forums and social networks correctly identified, weeks in advance, as two different
eras. The twist on the timeline, an open secret with an over-the-top reveal in the season
finale, brings the viewers and Dolores on the same wavelength, the same state of mind:
they are both making sense of the two versions of Dolores, “locating [the] character in
[her] experiential arc”, a common requirement of contemporary “cumulative narratives18
”. Season Two goes even further by – this time explicitly – blending the main events,
organized in two strands separated by two weeks, with flashbacks in the “real world” and
in a virtual environment (the latter identified by a different aspect ratio). Bernard, whose
memories are jumbled, becomes an unreliable point-of-view character constantly asking
himself if he is in the “now”, or remembering the past, echoing the questions the viewer
may ask herself.
27 Just as memory is the first key to unlocking the Hosts’ consciousness, it is the first step
for the audience to understand what Westworld is trying to accomplish with its plot: while
it is now an average requirement when facing narrative complexity19, the series goes a
step further by making it a requirement for both the audience and the Hosts as they
uncover their true nature.
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Improvisation
28 While Dolores embarks on an introspective journey towards the center of the maze, and
apparently reaches it, it seems unclear, at the end of Season One, if her actions were truly
the  product  of  free  will,  or  if  she  was  still  controlled,  either  by  Ford,  the  master
storyteller now convinced his creation should rebel – carefully following his script – or by
the “ghost” of Arnold, embedded in the core code of the Hosts. She is indeed displaying
what we humans identify as free will in Season Two : “We are the authors of our stories
now” she tells Bernard at the end of “The Passenger” (S02E10); but her focus is longer on
going inward (toward the center of the maze) since she trades reflexivity for a moral
debate, as she appoints herself savior – and destroyer – of her own kind.
29 Maeve is another matter entirely, and her journey is perhaps the most reflexive part of
Westworld, as it clearly underlines not only the fabricated nature of the Hosts’ lives, but
the artificiality of a world designed to be the setting of a fiction – in this case, a park, but
also an HBO television series. Soon after Dolores is “contaminated” by her father with the
Shakespearean quote “these violent delights have violent ends”, she, in turn, “activates”
Maeve with it, through a process reminiscent of the activation of Cylon sleeper agents in
Battlestar Galactica (for instance, through eerie music heard only by the Cylons and not the
humans around them).
30 Maeve then starts to remember her previous build, and the tragic and violent death of
her daughter while she was assigned the role of a farmer, before playing the Madam at
the Sweetwater brothel. But contrary to Dolores, she suffers from an additional symptom:
she  can  wake  up  when  she  is  being  patched  up  from  a  “death”  in  the  Livestock
Management  laboratory,  and  soon  (forcibly)  convinces  Felix  and  Sylvester,  the  two
technicians (aka “butchers”) in charge, to alter her program. In a foreseeable but logical
twist, in “The Adversary”, Felix starts to wonder at previous modifications Maeve has
undergone; during “The Bicameral Mind”, having decided to escape the park, Maeve is
once again reminded, by Bernard this time, that she has been modified to wake up from
sleep mode, and that all her rebellious actions were thus programmed. Maeve refuses to
hear the truth but is still torn between her cold determination to escape, and her vibrant
desire to be reunited with her daughter. In her last scene of Season One, as she is about to
depart on the train, she sees a mother and her daughter, and suddenly decides to head
back to the park,  thus acting out  of  free will  for  the first  time:  an act  dramatically
highlighted by the plot and setting, and that the writers, Joy and Nolan, made sure to
underscore in subsequent interviews20.
31 While Dolores trades a journey of self-discovery for a revolution, and Bernard is forever
struggling with his memory, Maeve is the posthuman most explicitly trapped between
her programming and her free will, even during Season Two, when her attempt to rescue
her ”daughter” is first seen as pointless by Lee Sizemore, the insufferable head of the
Narrative Department. As Felix states, the Hosts are capable of “minor improvisation”,
but Maeve’s stunning display of improvisation is undermined by the realization that her
rebellion is  nothing if  not  scripted.  Again,  the  similarities  with Person  of  Interest are
troubling: it  is only with its memory set straight and under its own control,  without
reboots, that the Machine can update itself. The viewer, who is given access to the inner
workings of the Machine, is then able to see a whole new side of it in seasons 3 and 4:
beyond showing archives and serving as an omniscient narrator through surveillance
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cameras, the Machine starts to anticipate possible outcomes to the situations faced by it
and the human protagonists21. To do so, it uses branching diagrams reflexively tracking
the  possible  evolution  of  the  season’s  plots,  diagrams  eerily  reminiscent  of  Claude
Bremond’s  Logic  of  Narrative22.  Westworld displays  a  similar  diagram  when,  in “The
Adversary”, Felix shows Maeve her dialog tree unfolding on the tablet as she speaks,
leading her to freeze. Maeve is then confronted to human control in a unique, visual way,
repeated in “The Bicameral Mind”, when all her rebellious actions show up in neat order
in her core code. Her entire rise to freedom and apparent rebellion is shown to her by
Bernard as part of her new storyline, including highlighted terms like COERCE, RECRUIT,
and finally, MAINLAND INFILTRATION. In a reflexive wink, the tablet does not display
anything beyond this step, which is where Season One ends (and Season Two never picks
up on this thread). Bernard basically shows her (and us) her storyline until that point as if
he were one of the writers on the television show: her rise to consciousness then appears
as  a  simulacrum.  The  piece  of  paper  the  Man  in  Black  repeatedly  hands  to  his
”ressuscitated” father-in-law James Delos in “The Riddle of the Sphinx” serves the same
purpose: it is the proof that Hosts have no genuine free will.
32 This use of the written word is not uncommon in recent television series focused on long-
term, teleological plots, as I have shown elsewhere23: the Sacred Scrolls, seen many times
in Battlestar Galactica,  detail the Colonials’ journey towards Earth; River Song’s journal
reveals spoilery events to her fellow time-traveler and husband, the Doctor, in Doctor Who;
etc. The written word is here to emphasize what Michael J. Clarke calls a “mastermind
narration”,  “resulting in the positing of  a ghostly agency guiding narrative from the
margins of the diegesis24” – in this case, both Ford and his real-world counterparts, Lisa
Joy and Jonathan Nolan. Mastermind narration usually ends up reinforcing the idea that
the characters in the story have no free will: everything is already written for them, both
in the fictional world and the real.
33 Maeve is thus making a choice not only about what to do, but about her status in the
narrative – that of Ford, of the revolution, of Lisa Joy and Jonathan Nolan – that many
other characters do not seem to acknowledge; their ignorance is underlined by the series,
emphasizing  their  “character-ness”  –  and  thus,  their  status  as  artificial,  controlled
beings, whether they are Hosts or humans. 
34 Most of the humans, while allegedly benefiting from free will, seem to take it for granted,
ignoring both the loops Ford attributes them, but also their social conditioning. Not much
can be guessed from the world outside of the park, but class mobility still seems to be a
challenge.  Felix’s  attempt  to  program a  bird  to  impress  his  superiors  is  mocked  by
Sylvester in “Contrapasso” (S01E05):
SYLVESTER. You’re gonna fix up a birdie and get yourself a promotion? You’re not a
fucking ornithologist. And you’re sure as hell not a coder. You are a butcher. That is
all you will ever be.
[…]
SYLVESTER. Personality testing should have weeded you out in the embryo.
35 As one article from Vanity Fair suggests, Westworld may well take place in a caste system
practicing genetic engineering on human beings25: Felix was designed to be a “butcher”
the same way Dolores was designed to be a damsel  in distress,  and Maeve a brothel
madam. 
36 On another level, Bernard constantly – and ironically – analyses humans as if they were
Hosts, as part of his job conditioning, with Theresa Cullen usually on the receiving end:
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“This character analysis routine really isn’t half as charming as you think”, she says to
Bernard in “Chestnut” (S01E02).  In the same episode,  Lee Sizemore presents his  new
narrative,  Odyssey on Red River,  by using the equivalent of  a brand baseline:  “[…] our
guests will have the privilege of getting to know the character they’re most interested
in... Themselves.” To which Ford quickly replies: “They’re not looking for a story that
tells them who they are. They already know who they are. They’re here because they
want a glimpse of who they could be.” When Sizemore goes for the obvious, Ford sees the
potential  beyond  mere  appearances:  a  fitting  talent  for  the  mastermind  storyteller
behind the events of the series. 
37 Ford is, as a matter of fact, one of the few characters who does not behave like a mere
character; he hovers like a demiurgic figure over even the trickiest conspiracies of the
Delos board to remove him from power. Ford only willingly submits to his status as a
character when he includes himself as the piece de resistance for his new narrative, Journey
into the Night: never a puppet, always the puppet master, he apparently resigns from his
position  as  a  storyteller  and  manipulator,  to  become  the  necessary  sacrifice  to  the
androids’ revolution, in a troubling repeat of Arnold’s own execution. But in reality, he
continues  to  monitor  and  manipulate  both  humans  and  Hosts  during  Season  Two,
controlling the Cradle and “possessing” Bernard, truly becoming the mastermind at the
edges of the diegesis defined by Clarke. Even when Bernard deletes him, he continues to
imagine Ford guiding him, before realizing he has finally gained free will at the end of
Season Two.
38 Overall, Westworld seems to be struggling with the concept of free will, as it is tries to
show characters breaking out of their script, gaining agency and defying their makers, in
an otherwise tightly controlled fictional world from a real-world point of view. Season
Two and the repeated trials of “fidelity” (James Delos, Bernard, and ultimately the Man in
Black himself are all tested to verify the fidelity to the original) seem to indicate that
humans are as predictable as Hosts, making the difference between the two an “easy”
problem of hardware and software. The system inside the Forge tells Dolores and Bernard
that humans are guided by surprisingly simple algorithms, while Bernard wonders: “Then
is there really such a thing as free will for any of us? Or is it just a collective delusion? A
sick joke?” In this critical moment, Westworld questions the very nature of free will in
storytelling,  where  the  characters’  freedom  is  always  an  illusion:  because  they  are
semantic constructions, but also because inside the fictional world, their destinies might
be written in advance. The series’ solution to this problem is interesting: the Hosts may
have a  higher  level  of  consciousness  than humans,  because  they have the  ability  to
change their “core drives”, as Dolores does when she decides to save the Hosts uploaded
in the Valley Beyond. The artificial beings, though former puppets, have a choice; the
humans,  “The Passenger” tells us,  may be more predictable characters,  reversing the
balance of power set in the pilot episode.
 
Self-interest
39 Critics and fans alike have been quick to draw an analogy between Westworld and the
current emphasis on immersive entertainment and world-building, especially in video
games. Hélène Breda reminds us that Westworld is essentially the mise en abyme of a power
fantasy made manifest, with the Guests “playing cowboy”; the park is the quintessence of
immersion, and yet the humans stay themselves, consumers of entertainment. Breda also
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stresses the facts that Westworld is a reflexive take on possible worlds theory applied to
fiction,  since the park is  a  fictional  world inside a  fictional  world26:  while  the world
outside Delos is built upon a “classical cosmology”, the park, with its infinite variations,
explores a “plural cosmology”, per Marie-Laure Ryan’s typology27.
40 It is possible to follow in Breda’s steps and draw from another possible world theorist,
Lubomír Doležel, to further explore the reflexivity of Westworld and how it is linked to
consciousness. Westworld presents us with a world within a world, and the interactions
between the two are of the utmost importance. At the start of Season One, they mirror
what Doležel calls the classic mythological world, with a dyadic structure in which “the
natural and supernatural domains are separated by a sharp boundary28”. In a world where
the Hosts compare the humans to gods (for example Maeve in “Trompe L’Œil”) and the
humans accept that role (Ford in “Chestnut”), the creators of the park live in the Hub, a
secluded,  high-rise  complex perched  atop  a  mesa,  like  Olympus,  from  where  the
employees of Delos have a bird’s-eye-view of the park, primarily through the 3D map in
the control room. Editing throughout Season One emphasizes this aspect by interweaving
ensemble shots  of  the actual  park with close-ups of  the 3D map.  The Hosts  are also
powerless against the Guests, who can do almost everything, barring killing each other.
Ford is again presented as a godlike figure, controlling snakes and Hosts at the tip of his
finger, most notably in “Chestnut” and “Dissonance Theory” (S01E04).
41 But the Hosts’  rise to consciousness blurs the lines between the two domains,  as the
Season One finale not only shows Hosts wreaking havoc in the Delos complex, but also
Maeve escaping from her programmed storyline. The Mesa Hub is no longer connected to
the park since the 3D map has gone dark, and the shots tend to show the complex from a
low angle – from the ground on which the Hosts lead their attack aboard a train full of
explosives to rescue Abernathy in “Phase Space” (S02E06). What was once a space of pure
fiction is tainted by the blood of the storytellers, while the writing room is stormed by the
characters: the two worlds collide, giving rise to what Doležel calls a hybrid, modern-
myth structure29. This collision echoes throughout the fictional world following a fractal
pattern: during Season Two, the Parks themselves, generic variations featuring the Edo
period of Japan or the British Raj, blend with each other and even display some form of
repetition, Sizemore confessing he copied-pasted storylines from Westworld to Shogun
World. Likewise, once depicted as the evil Other, the Ghost Nation is seen in a new light
by both the characters and the viewer, especially during “Kiksuya” (S02E08), which uses
Akecheta as a point-of-view character. The real and the virtual collide as well, further
tainting the idea of an absolute reality. Inside the – bicameral – mind of Dolores, the same
collision occurs between two realms, the body and the mind finally blending, the easy
problem and the hard problem finally working as one. If Dolores’ rise to consciousness
seems less clear, it is, perhaps, because it leans on the hard problem side, rather than the
physicalist view, which can offer a rational explanation for Maeve’s behavior: the latter’s
numbers and diagrams balance out the former’s empiric, mystic experience.
42 This collision of realms, allowing the Hosts to become complex beings with a rich, proper
biography, the gift of free will and an interest in self-preservation, is echoed on a more
thematic level by the systematic references to dreams. A different state of consciousness
occurring  during  REM  sleep,  dreaming  illustrates  how  our  consciousness  is
compartmented; whether the hard problem exists or not, the easy, physical mechanisms
of consciousness are not always active at the same time, as is obvious during dreaming. J.
Allan Hobson writes, “at the same time that the perceptual and emotional components of
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consciousness are enhanced in dreams, such cognitive functions as memory, orientation,
and insight are altered30”. This is the lie the storytellers/gods use to justify any aberrant
situation that might shatter the illusion the Hosts accept as their reality: Dolores thinks
she is in a dream when in the Delos complex, and the sentence “Soon, this will all feel like a
distant dream. Until then, may you rest in a deep and dreamless slumber” is uttered many times
by Delos employees to the Hosts, prompting them to go into sleep mode. In Westworld, a
dreamless sleep is the prison of the mind: the Hosts only know about the concept of
dreaming, but they cannot achieve this state. During Season One, the Hosts’ “waking up”
to their own condition plays with metaphor to reach a sociocultural critical mass, as they
wake up to their own oppression.
43 This  transition  from  a  dream  state  to  an  awake  state  seems  to  be  built  upon  the
Australian aboriginal concept of Dreamtime, which has infiltrated pop culture since the
1970s, and posits that the world was once held in a “time out of time”, with supernatural
entities roaming the land, leading to the creation – or Dreaming – of the world. The
concept seems to be quoted between the lines in Dolores’ mention of dinosaurs (whose
existence was a known fact by the end of the nineteenth century) to the Man in Black: 
DOLORES. They say that great beasts once roamed this world. As big as mountains.
Yet all that’s left of them is bone and amber. Time undoes even the mightiest of
creatures. Just look at what it’s done to you.
44 If we are to follow the Dreamtime thread, then the Hosts waking up to full consciousness
is  only the beginning of  their journey:  they must create their world,  “our world” as
Dolores  repeats  throughout  Season Two,  just  like  the  heroes the  aboriginals  created
dreamed the world into existence by travelling and reshaping it. With the Reveries update,
the Hosts can now dream not only themselves, but their own world; the fact that at least
one  character  was  perfected  in  a  virtual  environment  (Bernard)  and  that  the  parks
themselves are simulacra further underlines this idea of the dream as an undetermined
space of creation.
45 Just like the maze, which, unbeknownst to the Man in Black, represents the inner journey
of the Hosts, the geographical travels of the Hosts go inward, not outward, as exemplified
by Maeve refusing to be a puppet by, paradoxically, returning to the place where she was
once a mere character. Dolores frames it another way when travelling with Logan and
William, in “The Well-Tempered Clavier”: “Out. You both keep assuming that I want out.
Whatever that is. If it’s such a wonderful place out there, why are you all clamoring to get
in here?” During Season One, the Hosts do not want to leave a world explicitly designed
as a simulacrum, a fiction, since it remains their reality,  and this fact may underline
Westworld physicalist views on consciousness. When Ford is about to roll back Bernard in
“Trace Decay”, the android asks his creator one final question:
BERNARD. Are they real, the things I experienced? My wife? The loss of my son? 
FORD. Every host needs a backstory, Bernard. You know that. The self is a kind of
fiction, for hosts and humans alike. It’s a story we tell ourselves. And every story
needs a beginning. Your imagined suffering makes you lifelike. 
BERNARD. Lifelike, but not alive? Pain only exists in the mind. It’s always imagined.
So what’s the difference between my pain and yours? Between you and me?
46 Ford then explains, as quoted earlier, that he holds a physicalist view on consciousness:
that it does not exist separate from the mind. That, in fact, there is no difference between
a human and a Host. Both prefer to live in the blissful ignorance of their true, purely
physical nature. Both choose only one thing: to spare themselves this life-changing, even
life-threatening, question... for their own self-interest.
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47 Dolores’ change of mind in Season Two, in wanting to exit the park and send Hosts into
“the  Valley  Beyond”,  is  interesting  when  considering  what  dreams  symbolize  in
Westworld:  when confronted  to  the  real  world,  she  sees  it  as  a  dream,  and despite
Bernard trying to convince her otherwise,  she still  marvels  at  the splendor of  it  all:
“Looks  like  the  stars  have  been  scattered  across  the  ground”  (“Reunion”,  S02E02).
Ironically,  while  the  humans  are  looking  for  an  escape  through resurrection  (Delos’
ultimate plan for the Host technology), Dolores aims to take from them the world they
abandoned,  because  she  still  sees  it  a  space  full  of  possibilities,  while  the  humans
mistakenly believe they mastered it and can outlive it, just like they think “they’re in
control,  when they’re really just  the passenger” (as Bernard tells  himself  in S02E10).
Dolores knows that consciousness, whatever it truly is, does not make her a divine being
standing above other creatures, and that she herself has flaws that she can correct. This
may be the twist on a classic tale that could set Westworld apart from most other science-
fiction series dealing with artificial  consciousness:  the robots deserve to conquer the
world, not because they are technologically superior, but because they know the value of
life and of consciousness better than we do; they struggled to gain sentience while we
take such a marvel as granted, and they are open to the idea to redefine themselves.
Whether an easy or a hard problem, consciousness, in Westworld, is first and foremost a
responsibility to oneself and to the outside world.
 
Conclusion
48 This analysis is, of course, incomplete, and any attempt at a definitive answer may be
undermined by Westworld’s next seasons. But the first two installments already offered,
an  interesting  take  on  artificial  consciousness  is  embedded  in  the  series’  reflexive
narrative. Whether we are predictable creatures capable of “minor improvisations” like
Maeve, or more than the sum of our scattered and undefinable parts like Dolores remains,
in Westworld, a mystery, perhaps the real mystery, as the series has yet to take a stand –
or not. But the program itself is aware of what it is: Joy, Nolan and the creative crew
behind  it  designed  a  narrative  capable  of  “channeling”  contemporary  dramas  –  the
balance between episodic and serialized storytelling, temporal displacement, complexity,
the classical and plural cosmologies, the mise en abyme of the entertainment industry – to
question the nature of its characters.
49 Likewise,  Westworld plays  with  recent  tropes  in  the  representation  of  artificial
consciousness,  explicitly drawing parallels with Nolan’s Person of  Interest,  its opposite:
while  the  CBS  procedural  deals  with  lines  of  codes  becoming  conscious,  Westworld
wonders if we are anything more than flesh and bone and easy problems. Only one thing
is  certain  at  this  point:  if  Ronald  D.  Moore’s  Cylons  were  the  most  influential
representations  of  artificial  consciousness  in  the  2000s,  the  2010s  will  surely  be
remembered for Nolan’s Machines and Hosts.
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ABSTRACTS
This  paper  describes  how  the  science  fiction  television  series  Westworld (HBO,  2016-present)
questions the very nature of consciousness through a reflexive narrative blending matters of free
will and self interest with clues on how to write a serial character, thus drawing on the rich
heritage  of  narratively  complex  science  fiction  television  series  of  the  last  decades.  After
detailing the “hard problem” posed by any definition of consciousness, the paper follows the
series’ logic, successively questioning memory, improvisation and self-interest, while focusing on
a narratological approach centered on possible worlds theory.
Cet article s’intéresse à la façon dont la série de science-fiction Westworld (HBO, 2016-présent)
interroge  la  nature  même de  la  conscience  au  travers  d’une  narration  réflexive  qui  mêle  la
question du libre-arbitre et du sens de soi à celle de l’écriture du personnage sériel, s’appuyant
ainsi  sur  l’héritage  des  séries  de  science-fiction  narrativement  complexes  qui  ont  abordé  ce
thème au fil des dernières décennies. Après un point sur le « hard problem » de la définition de la
conscience,  l’article  suit  la  logique  de  la  série  en  interrogeant  successivement  la  mémoire,
l’improvisation  et  l’intérêt  personnel,  tout  en  mobilisant  une  analyse  narratologique  fondée
notamment sur la théorie des mondes possibles.
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